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Abstract 
The assets of the hedge fund industry are nearly equivalent to the GDP of the UK. The 
industry, which claims returns independent of markets conditions and has been blamed for 
economic crises, has attracted the interest of a wide range of financial and political players and 
academics. This paper, using monthly series performance data since January 1995, at a fund 
strategy level and S&P500, and a holistic and a developed dynamic correlation quantitative 
approach, aims to challenge the allegations and the claims, which have been made on rather 
incomplete research grounds. Statistically, the results strongly reject the claims of the vast 
majority of fund strategies, excluding the case of the macro and short strategies, over the crisis 
periods, suggesting that they cannot protect their investors like S&P500. Regarding the 
allegations, it is inferred that Hedge Funds are used in most cases as a scapegoat rather than 
actually being the cause of the crises.  
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1. Introduction 
 Hedge funds play a critical role in financial markets by broadening the use of 
investment strategies, increasing the number of participating investors and enlarging the pools of 
available capital. For investors, hedge funds serve a risk-management purpose, achieving returns 
that are often uncorrelated to those in the equity and fixed-income markets. At the same time, 
hedge funds provide liquidity for mispriced assets –arbitrage opportunities– particularly when 
large volumes are traded in a thin market which is a volatility reducing activity (Blundell, 2007). 
For these reasons, hedge funds have gained a great deal of economic and political prominence 
over the last two decades (Quaglia, 2009). Their assets under management have grown 
substantially; from $41 billion in 1990 to approximately $3 trillion in 2014, which is almost 
equal to the real GDP of the UK. Politically, the activity of hedge funds has come to the centre 
of attention for their alleged role in the Asian financial crisis in 1997, after the collapse of the 
LTCM fund in 1998, in the burst of the high-tech bubble in 2000, and in the 2008 subprime 
crisis. These events emphasized the potential systemic impact that can be driven by the behavior 
of hedge funds and especially by the use of extended leverage. 
Within this framework, the issue of the role and the effect of hedge funds on economic 
crises is frequently raised, with opposing views arising during and after every financial crisis. 
One argument is well summarized in Stromqvist's (2009) statement that, although hedge fund 
investments in the price adjustment of incorrectly valued assets, under normal conditions, have a 
positive impact on the effectiveness of the market, during financial crises they contribute to 
market instability. The opposing side claims that hedge funds do not drive financial crises on the 
grounds and that, in most cases, on a broad front, they have been hurt (Brown et al., 1999 and 
2001, IOSCO 2006 and 2009, Palaskas et al., 2013). However, the fact that hedge funds have 
experienced losses during crises does not rule out the possibility that they may have played a 
role, together with banks and other institutional investors (ECB, 2008), in the development of 
the crisis. 
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The rising divergence in the arguments and the research conducted on the role of hedge 
funds in financial markets have shed only limited light on the questions which have naturally 
arisen, bearing in mind the aim of hedge funds, which factors influence the performance of 
hedge fund investment strategies under economic turmoil, and if and to what extent these factors 
are able to protect investors in downturns. 
To this end, the paper aims to contribute to the existing literature and discussion on two 
levels. First, the performance of hedge funds, using monthly frequency data from January 1995 
to September 2014, a period which witnessed the most important financial turmoil of the last 30 
years, will be analysed in order to shed light on the question if and to what extent they managed 
to generate absolute returns, as they allege. Second, by adopting a holistic approach -Carhart’s 
asset pricing model, dynamic volatility and correlation estimates, structural break and equality 
of means tests - hedge fund performance across all strategies during crisis and non-crisis periods 
will be assessed. 
The paper, apart from the introduction and the conclusion, unfolds in three sections. The 
section below provides a brief literature review on hedge funds. Section 3 presents and discusses 
the quantitative approach adopted to derive the results discussed in section 4, and is followed by 
section 5 the conclusion.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The hedge fund industry has been cloaked in secrecy within the asset management 
territory until the beginning of the ‘90s. Till then qualitative and quantitative information about 
their investment strategies was unavailable to the broader investment community (Makarewicz 
et al., 2011). Over the last three decades, many aspects of the hedge fund industry have become 
better known, mainly due to academic studies. On the brink of the last and the current 
millennium Ackermann et al. (1999), Brown et al. (1999), Amin and Kat (2003) and Agarwal 
and Naik (2004) attempted to compare the performance of hedge funds using benchmark 
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indices, while Brown et al. (1999) and Liang (2000, 2001) focused on the perseverance of their 
returns. Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Brown et al. (1995, 2001) analysed hedge fund investment 
style adopting quantitative models. Fung and Hsieh (1997), Liang (1999), Amin and Kat (2003) 
and Agarwal and Naik (2004) focused on the correlation of hedge funds with other investment 
products and analysed the power of hedge fund diversification properties. Another group of 
authors (Schneeweis and Spurgin, 1998, Amenc et al., 2002) turned their interest to the risk to 
which Hedge Funds are exposed, proving that their returns are exposed, beyond market risk, to 
volatility risk, default risk and/or liquidity risk. 
The available research on the link between hedge fund performance and economic crises, 
the core question of the present paper, is quite recent, and has been examined employing 
approaches ranging from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), to the models of Fama and 
French (1993), Carhart (1997), Ackermann et al. (1999), Liang (1999), Do et al. (2005), Fung 
and Hsieh (2006), Steri et al. (2008), Criton and Scaillet (2011), Jordao and Moura (2011)
1
, etc. 
The early stage researchers employed the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964) model to specify the 
return of a high-risk asset portfolio minus the return of the risk-free rate as a function of the 
market risk premium. Three decades later, Fama and French (1993) with CAPM as a starting 
point, added two factors to explain the returns of portfolios:  the company size effect and the 
market value effect, Using Fama and Frenchs’ (1993) model, Carhart (1997) then added the 
variable ‘momentum effect’2 (Jordao and Moura, 2011) to explain portfolio returns. 
At the same time, while Ackermann et al. (1999), using hedge fund performance rates, 
management fees and age to explain variations in the Sharpe ratio, concluded that hedge funds 
consistently outperform mutual funds but not standard market indices, Liang (1999), employing 
an asset class factor model and a mean-variance efficient analysis framework, provided a 
                                                 
1
 For a more extensive analysis of the literature see Jordao and Moura (2011). 
2
It is defined as the difference between the return of a hypothetical portfolio that includes companies with the 
highest returns over 11 months and the returns of a similar portfolio that comprises companies with the worst 
returns over the same period. 
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comprehensive evaluation of hedge fund performance and risk. The applied research initiatives 
and attempts to understand and quantify the factors determining hedge fund performance, 
independent of the economic cycle, hold up well today.  Fung and Hsieh (2004), performing a 
modified version of the CUSUM test, identified structural break-points in hedge fund factor 
loadings with major market events, such as, the collapse of LTCM in September 1998 and the 
peak of the technology bubble in March 2000. Do et al. (2005) concluded, by evaluating the 
Australian hedge fund market and adopting a modified Sharpe ratio
3
, that although hedge funds 
are ineffective as single investments, the addition of a hedge fund to a portfolio, irrespective of 
strategy, improves its returns.  Three years later, Steri et al. (2008) developed a model for Italian 
hedge funds applying panel analysis to assess the performance of both temporal data of market 
indices and cross-sectional data of the distinct characteristics of funds. Their findings show that 
high performance fees and long redemption periods produce a negative effect on the 
performance of hedge funds.  
In 2011, three applied works, Criton and Scaillet (2011), Jordao and Moura (2011) and 
Boasson et al. (2011), using case studies data and different quantitative approaches attempted to 
shed light on hedge fund performance. The first, Criton and Scaillet (2011), employing 
structural change tests, identified heterogeneity within each strategy; however at the same time 
they show that, whatever the strategy, exposures are concentrated on the credit spread and the 
bond risk factors. Jordao and Moura (2011), using Brazilian data, tested the claim that, under a 
scenario of high volatility and financial stress, hedge funds can produce abnormal returns with a 
low correlation to market risk. The results were unfavourable for the Brazilian hedge fund 
industry since only 3.7% of the funds presented positive and statistically significant alpha 
coefficients. Finally, Boasson et al. (2011), using Carhart’s (1997) multi-factor asset-pricing 
model, examined the risk and return performance of hedge fund investment strategies, which is 
close to the core question of this paper. Their results indicate that, on average, hedge fund 
                                                 
3
 It takes into account the non-normality of fund returns. 
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returns have relatively low correlations with the market, implying that investments in hedge 
funds could potentially offer better opportunities for diversification. More recently, Bussiere et 
al. (2014) measured the commonality in hedge fund returns, identified its main driving factors 
and found that hedge fund commonality increased significantly from 2003 until 2006 which is 
attributed to the increase in hedge fund exposure to emerging market equities. They also 
demonstrated that funds with high commonality were affected disproportionately by illiquidity 
and exhibited negative returns during the 2008 financial crisis, thereby providing few 
diversification benefits to the financial system and to investors. Sun et al. (2015) provided novel 
evidence that hedge fund performance persists following periods of relative hedge fund market 
weakness, but not following periods of relative market strength. Their findings suggest an error-
in-measurement problem embedded in the unconditional average historical hedge fund returns, 
which, in turn, weakens their performance predictability. 
To sum up, the literature on hedge fund performance, although relatively extensive since 
the late nineties, tends to focus on specific indicators and does not, in most cases, take into 
account the effect of economic and/or financial crises separately. Consequently, the variation in 
findings may very well depend on the indicators chosen and the timeframe of the analysis. The 
present paper aims at a twofold contribution to the literature. First, it adopts a holistic approach 
to assess hedge fund performance under pre and ongoing crisis scenarios. Second, it develops 
and applies a dynamic conditional correlation framework to investigate whether crises are 
responsible for the change in the correlation pattern between hedge fund risk adjusted 
performance and S&P500, the main benchmark indicator. 
 
3. Data and Performance Indicators 
The discussion in the literature in conjunction with the set hypothesis under examination 
prompted the definition of the variables to be used in the quantitative analysis. 
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Data 
The quantitative analysis uses monthly data over the period January 1995 - September 
2014 obtained from Hedge Fund Research Inc. (HFRI)
4
. The variables are the monthly 
performance (see Figure 1) for each of the classified strategies, i.e. Convertible Arbitrage, 
Distressed, Emerging Markets, Equity Hedge, Equity Neutral, Event Driven, Macro, Merger 
Arbitrage, Relative Value, Short Selling, Multistrategy and Fund of Funds.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Carhart’s model 
To begin, Carhart’s (1997) approach is adopted. Understanding the specific model 
requires a brief presentation of Sharpe’s CAPM, and the preceding Fama-French approach. The 
CAPM assumes that an asset’s excess return is determined by its correlation with excess market 
return: 
 
titftMiitfti uRRaRR ,,,,,   , (1) 
where tiR ,  is the portfolio return of asset i in month t; tfR ,  is the return on a risk-free asset, tMR ,  
is the return on market portfolio and tiu ,  is the error term. In Fama and French’s (1993) 
specification, the CAPM model is augmented by the addition of the difference between portfolio 
returns on small stocks and portfolio returns on large stocks (SMB) and the return difference of 
portfolios with high book-to-market equity and returns with low book-to-market equity (HML). 
Carhart (1997) modified Fama and French's specification by adding to the explanatory variables 
the momentum effect (PR1YR) to perform the regression of excess return of funds:  
 
tititititftMiitfti uYRPRHMLSMBRRaRR ,,,,, 1   . (2) 
The intercept ia  measures the administrator’s ability index which quantifies the abnormal 
returns earned by the fund, since the return obtained by the administrator is not explained by any 
                                                 
4
 Despite its limitations, the HFRI database is one of the largest hedge fund databases available for academic 
research and is extensively used worldwide to support investors’ decisions. For more details see Fung et al. (2002). 
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exposure to risk factors in the models (Jordao and Moura, 2011). The beta index i , accounts 
for the fund's systematic risk.  
Structural Breaks and Equality of Means 
The next step in our approach is to test, consistently with the paper’ questions, for the 
presence of structural breaks, crisis vs non crisis periods, in the performance of each hedge fund 
strategy. The tests are applied on the Carhart’s specification: 
 
  .1
1
,,2,2,2,2,,,2,2,,
,,1,1,1,1,,,1,1,,
tititititftMiitfti
tititititftMiitfti
uYRPRHMLSMBRRaRR
uYRPRHMLSMBRRaRR




 (3) 
The null hypothesis asserts that: ii aa ,2,1  , ii ,2,1   , ii ,2,1   ,  ii ,2,1    and ii ,2,1    under 
the assumption that  2
...
,, ,0~ ju
dii
tij Nu  , where 1j  refers to crisis periods and 2j  to non 
crisis periods. The analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis test are employed to assess the 
equality of mean performance for each strategy within and between crisis periods. 
Dynamic Estimates of Correlation 
Finally, for a number of reasons explained in this section, a multivariate framework is 
developed and applied to our data for the dynamic estimation of the variance-covariance matrix 
of monthly returns. This will enable us to investigate the time-varying correlation among the 
returns of the 13 hedge fund strategies under consideration and the S&P500.
5
 The intention is to 
provide dynamic estimates of the correlations in order to overcome the drawbacks of the static 
correlation specifications that have been applied to explore hedge fund performance. The 
dynamic estimation of the correlation matrix provides the exact information that the fund 
                                                 
5
 The S&P500 was chosen as a benchmark because, due to the globalization of the financial markets, it reflects to a 
large extent all crisis incidents. 
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managers are interested in: the month to month changes of the time-varying correlation between 
hedge fund returns and S&P500.
6
 
In our case, the   ttttt HFHFHF P500&S... ,13,2,1y  vector denotes the returns of 
the hedge funds 
tiHF , , for 13,...,1i , and the S&P500 index at a monthly frequency t . The 
vector of the monthly returns is assumed to be decomposed into the predictable component 
 ttE y1 ,
7
 and the unpredictable component tε . The tε  has a conditional variance-covariance 
matrix tH .The generalized proposed framework is: 
 
 
 ,,...,,...,,
,,;~
2121
2/1
1





ttttt
tt
ttt
tttt
f
E
εεHHH
I0zz
zHε
εyy


 (4) 
where tz  is a vector process with   0z tE ,   Izz ttE and multivariate density function 
 ,,; I0z tf . 
 However, due to the characteristics of hedge fund data series, the framework of equation 
(4) is developed as follows: First, due to the autocorrelation pattern of monthly returns, the 
 ttE y1  is modelled as an autoregressive process
8
. Second, since it has been established that 
hedge fund returns are non-normally distributed (Leland, 1999; Cotton, 2000), the multivariate 
Student t density function for the standardized residuals
 t
z
 
is adopted. Third, the variance-
covariance matrix tH  
is constructed according to Engle's (2002) Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation, or DCC, specification, not only because it has been successively applied for 
estimating time-varying covariance matrices on a large scale similar to our case of 14 assets but 
                                                 
6
 For more information relating to the construction of the dynamic frameworks of correlation matrices estimation 
and its advantages, the interested reader is refered to Degiannakis et al. (2013) and Degiannakis et al. (2016), 
among others. 
7
  
tt
E y
1  
is the expected value of  
t
y conditional on the information set available at time 1t , 
1t
I . 
8
 The last month’s performance elaborates the auto-dependence for all hedge funds. 
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also because, it requires the estimation of fewer numbers of parameters than other multivariate 
GARCH models such as Engle and Kroner's (1995) BEKK model, Engle's et al. (1986) VECH 
model, etc. Finally, since the volatility of hedge fund returns exhibits significant asymmetry (see 
Elyasiani et al., 2010), the conditional variance must be modelled asymmetrically with respect 
to the lagged values of variance and squared residuals. Hence, the Glosten et al.’s (1993) 
Threshold ARCH, or TARCH, specification which models the leverage effect (i.e. good news 
and bad news to have different effects on the conditional variance) is assumed. 
 Therefore, the re-specified multivariate dynamic framework, AR-DCC-TARCH-t, takes 
the form: 
 
 
.
,,;~
2/12/1
2/1
111
tttt
tt
ttt
ttt
t
ΣCΣH
I0zz
zHε
εycccIy 0


 

 (5) 
The     1111   tttE ycccIy 0  states the 1
st
 order autoregressive process, and the  ,,; I0z tt  
denotes the multivariate standardized Student t density function: 
    
    
2
2/
2
1
22
2
,,;
n
tt
nt
n
t


















zz
I0z , (6) 
where  .  is the gamma function and   (for 2 ) is the degree of freedoms to be estimated. 
The Student t distribution captures the excess leptokurtosis observed in returns of hedge funds 
(Leland, 1999; Cotton, 2000). The DCC specification decomposes the covariance matrix 
2/12/1
tttt ΣCΣH  , where 
2/1
tΣ  is the diagonal matrix with the conditional standard deviations 
along the diagonal: 
 tttt diag ,14,2,12/1 ,...,, Σ , (7) 
and tC  is the matrix of conditional correlations. The 
2
,ti , for 14,...,1i , are defined as Glosten 
et al.’s (1993) TARCH specification: 
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  2 1,2 1,1,2 1,0,2,
~
0~~~   tiititiitiiiti bdaa  , (8) 
where 
iiii baa
~
,~,~,~ 0,   are parameters to be estimated,   10 itd   if 0it , and 
  00 itd   likewise. The good news  0it , has an impact of ia , whereas the bad news 
 0it , has an impact of iia   on the conditional variance (i.e. leverage effect). 
 The matrix of conditional correlations has the form: 
2/1*2/1*  tttt QQQC , (9) 
where  tjit q ,,Q  is computed as: 
    1111   tttt baba QzzQQ , (10) 
for      1,14,141,2,21,1,1,14,2,1 ,...,,,...,, tttttttttt zzz z , Q  is the unconditional covariance of tz  
and 2/1*
tQ  is a diagonal matrix that contains the square roots of the inverse of the diagonal 
elements of tQ :
9
 
 2/1 ,14,142/1 ,2,22/1,1,12/1* ,...,,   tttt qqqdiagQ . (11) 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
In line with the set hypotheses of the paper, the derived results and  analysis are referred 
to six periods: i) the total sample period from January, 1995 to September, 2014; ii) the 1997 
Asian crisis; iii) the LTCM crisis in 1998; iv) a period including the worst losses of the S&P500 
index given the burst of the dot com bubble in 2000; v) a period including the worst losses of 
the S&P500 index due to the global financial crisis (subprime crisis) in 2008; and vi) the 
European debt crisis in 2011. 
To illustrate the entire sample involved and the defined sub-periods/crisis data behaviour 
of each hedge fund strategy, descriptive statistics are quoted (Table 1) and analysed. The 
                                                 
9
 Xekalaki and Degiannakis (2010) provide technical information for the estimation of the model. 
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calculated average monthly return of 0.75% for the HFRI index is slightly higher than the 
benchmark stock market index (S&P500) with a substantially lower standard deviation, 
demonstrating the higher risk of S&P500. Taking fund strategies individually, it is noted that 
their average performance varies from -0.20 for Short Selling funds to 0.87 for Equity Hedge 
funds. Standard deviations also vary considerably among the various hedge fund strategies with 
the Short Selling Funds possessing the highest (5.10) while at the antipode the Equity Neutral 
funds have the smallest deviations (0.89). In addition, the statistics on skewness and kurtosis 
confirm that the majority of hedge fund strategies are asymmetrically and leptokurtically 
distributed; an issue that must be taken into consideration in the following statistical analysis. 
Finally, the estimated monthly premiums of SMB factor and of HML factor are 0.17% and 
0.24%, respectively (see Table 2). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Next, there is a discussions of whether or not the results of each of the adopted 
approaches is in line with the paper’s fundamental question, i.e. whether hedge funds manage to 
produce returns irrespective of market movements. To start with, the existence of structural 
breaks for each of the thirteen fund strategies in both crisis and non-crisis
10
 sample periods is 
tested. The results, in Table 3, statistically reject, at a 95% level of significance, excluding 
Convertible Arbitrage, Equity Neutral, Macro and Short Selling fund strategies, the non-
existence of the structural breaks hypothesis between the two periods, suggesting that the 
majority of hedge fund/strategies managers did not succeed in hedging their way out of the 
crises. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Bearing in mind that the involved time series are not normally distributed (see the 
discussion above), an additional test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, is applied to examine the equality 
                                                 
10
 The returns of the 13 hedge fund strategies were dichotomized between non crisis and crisis periods. 
 13 
of the coefficients (Table 4). The results
11
 overwhelmingly and statistically support (at a 95% 
level of significance) the findings of managers’ failure to hedge over crisis periods, with the 
only exception the Macro strategy. The ability of the Macro strategy to produce results 
irrespective of market movements can be attributed to the fact that it plays the macro theme 
meaning that is not driven by the fundamentals of the companies but by a thorough analysis of 
the macroeconomic developments of the global markets, which are driving market behavior as 
opposed to company fundamentals.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
For the reasons already discussed, the developed multivariate dynamic framework (AR-
DCC-TARCH-t) is applied to examine the hypothesis of the existence or not of a dynamic 
correlation between the 13 fund strategies and the S&P500 index which is used as a benchmark 
of fund performance. The results of the developed DCC model (Figure 2) show that the dynamic 
correlations between each of the fund strategies and the S&P500 vary over time with a tendency 
to increase during crisis periods. More precisely, according to Table 5, it is observed that, over 
crisis periods that are characterized by co-movement in the volatility of global equity markets, 
the dynamic correlation coefficient strengthens statistically, a finding confirmed by Forbes and 
Ribogon (2002)
12
 and Guesmi et al. (2014)
13
.  In only two cases: i) the Macro (it presents an 
increased correlation with S&P500 over the Asian crisis due to the nature of the particular crisis, 
i.e. currencies); and ii) the Short Selling (due to negative market exposure) the choice of the 
dynamic correlation coefficient is not statistically significant, supporting the claim of fund 
managers and illustrating at the same time the power of diversification in allowing 
outperformance of markets during downturns.  
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 Refer separately to each of the six periods under consideration. 
12
 They found that the correlations between hedge funds and global stocks alter during crisis periods. 
13
 Based on a (both unconditionally and conditionally) symmetric DCC model, Guesmi et al. (2014) examined the 
correlations between hedge fund strategy indices and asset classes and revealed correlations between hedge fund 
strategies and the stock market. 
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[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The question of whether hedge funds managed to deliver superior returns over the 
S&P500 irrespective of market movements and to hedge the systematic market risk is also tested 
applying the Carhart (1997) model for: i) the whole sample; and ii) for the crisis periods.  
The models’ derived results, the Jensen's alpha abnormal returns and the beta 
coefficients, accounting for the systematic market risk and the market timing coefficients, are 
summarized in Tables 6 and 7. According to the empirical evidence in Table 7 we note that: 
first, over the whole sample period, nine of the thirteen hedge fund strategies were able to obtain 
performances statistically superior to the benchmark (i.e. S&P500). The fact that 4 of the hedge 
fund strategies have statistically non-significant alphas i.e. Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, 
Short Selling and Fund of Funds, was not expected, given that the main aim of hedge funds is to 
achieve abnormal returns and to outperform the market and the risk-free rate. On the other hand, 
over the crisis periods, the only hedge fund strategies that managed to outperform the 
benchmark were Macro, mainly due to its top down nature, and Short Selling, since these funds 
present their highest performance in bear markets. 
Second, analysis of the risk perspective of the hedge fund strategies requires a thorough 
examination of the null hypothesis of the beta coefficients, which is rejected at a 99% level of 
significance (Table 7) across all the hedge fund strategies. Statistically, the findings strongly 
suggest that almost all fund strategies failed, to a large extent, to hedge the systematic market 
risk
14
. However, running the same model over the crisis periods, the results accept the null 
hypothesis for two hedge fund strategies, Macro and Short Selling, implying that they were the 
only strategies, when, under financial turmoil, managed to hedge the market systemic risk.  
                                                 
14
 With the exception of the Macro strategy that has a 0,07 non-statistically significant coefficient at 95% level of 
significance. 
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The administrator’s ability to forecast the market, which is implied by the fund 
managers’ claim of hedging, is also estimated using Carhart’s specification (eq. 3), by taking 
advantage of being long on the high return stocks and short on the low return stocks (Jordao and 
Moura, 2011). To confirm the existence of market timing, the coefficient i  of eq. 3 must be 
positive and statistically significant. The findings in Tables 6 and 7, indicate that 62% of the 
hedge fund strategies have market timing ability according to Cahart’s model over the total 
period of analysis and only 1 strategy during crisis period (Equity Neutral).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
Using monthly performance data and adopting a holistic approach through the DCC 
model framework, the Carhart model and statistical indicators such as structural break and 
equality of means tests, the paper examined the hedge fund claim of being able to hedge during 
crisis and non crisis periods versus the widely adopted benchmark, the S&P500 index. To 
overcome a number of the issues discussed, a dynamic correlation, the DDC approach, is 
developed and adopted. If indeed the weakly correlation assumption statistically holds under any 
market circumstances, then their claim holds and investors should turn to hedge funds to protect 
their assets during bear markets. 
In both crisis and non-crisis sample periods, the existence of structural breaks is 
statistically accepted for the majority of hedge fund/strategies, a result also supported by the 
equality of the coefficients tests (Kruskal-Wallis) which highlights the failure of hedge fund 
managers, excluding the Macro fund strategy, to hedge their way out of crises.  The findings of 
the developed AR-DCC-TARCH-t model not only strongly statistically support the existence of 
dynamic correlations between each of the fund strategies and the S&P500 index, but also 
demonstrate that these correlations also strengthen during crisis periods. Among the fund 
strategies, in only two cases, those of Macro and Short Selling, the pick in dynamic correlation 
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coefficients is not statistically significant, thus illustrating the power of diversification in 
allowing outperformance of markets during downturns. Finally, according to the results of the 
Carhart model, over crisis periods the only hedge fund strategies that managed to outperform the 
benchmark were Macro and Short Selling. Moreover, a thorough examination of the null 
hypothesis of beta coefficients shows that it is rejected at a 99% level of significance across all 
hedge fund strategies. This finding strongly suggests statistically that almost all fund strategies 
failed to a large extent to hedge the systematic market risk. However, running the same model 
over the crisis periods, the results do not reject the null hypothesis for the two hedge fund 
strategies, Macro and Short Selling, implying that they were the only strategies that, under 
financial turmoil, managed to hedge the systemic market risk.  
As discussed above, the Macro and Short Selling funds are the sole exceptions which 
succeeded in providing protection to their investors under severe financial conditions. This fact 
that may well be explained by the way in which the two investment strategies are formed. For 
Macro funds, which are considered the traditional strategy in the alternative space, the 
investment decision is typically based on forecasts and analysis about interest rates trends, the 
general flow of funds, political changes, government policies, inter-government relations, and 
other broad systemic factors. In addition, global macro traders and managers come primarily 
from the risk side of trading. In the case of Short Selling Funds, in bull markets their investment 
decisions are driven by companies’ fundamentals but in periods of financial and economic 
turbulence in general and during the subprime crisis in particular, short selling, when not 
banned, produced returns due to the collapse of the market.  
Overall, the present paper concludes that in cases of severe financial stress, hedge funds, 
excluding the Macro and Short Selling strategies, do not manage to produce absolute returns 
irrespective of market movements. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Hedge Fund Strategies and S&P500 Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ConvertArb -16.01 9.74 0.7086 2.78343 -1.473 9.440 
Distressed -8.50 5.55 0.7824 1.77737 -1.629 6.137 
EmergingTotal -21.02 14.80 0.7379 3.93321 -0.988 4.639 
EquityHedge -9.46 10.88 0.8746 2.61197 -0.232 2.446 
EquityNeutral -2.87 3.59 0.4632 0.89372 -0.285 2.377 
EventDriven -8.90 5.70 0.8428 1.91594 -1.314 4.805 
HFRI -8.70 7.65 0.7492 1.99011 -0.667 3.069 
Macro -3.77 6.82 0.6619 1.79642 0.524 0.696 
MergerArb -5.69 2.54 0.5978 1.02609 -1.577 6.270 
RelativeVal -8.03 3.93 0.6922 1.22225 -2.935 16.758 
ShortSell -21.21 22.84 -0.2050 5.10005 0.430 3.502 
Multistrategy -8.40 3.89 0.4486 1.36401 -2.700 13.755 
FoF -7.75 7.73 0.4573 1.75465 -0.537 4.354 
S&P500 -16.94 10.77 0.7146 4.39203 -0.727 1.173 
Source: HFRI and Estimations.   
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
SMB -16.40 22.02 0.17 3.49 
HML -12.61 13.88 0.24 3.28 
PR1YR -34.72 18.39 0.45 5.33 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
 
 
Table 3. Test Results for Structural Breaks 
 F Sig. 
ConvArb 0.7 0.60 
Distressed 7.3 0.00 
EmergingTotal 9.4 0.00 
EquityHedge 5.0 0.00 
EquityNeutral 0.2 0.95 
EventDriven 6.5 0.00 
HFRI 5.5 0.00 
Macro 0.2 0.94 
MergerArb 4.7 0.00 
RelatVal 3.8 0.00 
ShortSell 0.3 0.93 
Multistrategy 18.4 0.00 
FoF 5.8 0.00 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
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Table 4. Analysis of Equality of Means 
 Sig. 
ConvertArb 0.000 
Distressed 0.000 
EmergingTotal 0.000 
EquityHedge 0.000 
EquityNeutral 0.000 
EventDriven 0.000 
HFRI 0.000 
Macro 0.061 
MergerArb 0.000 
RelativeVal 0.000 
ShortSell 0.000 
Multistrategy 0.000 
FoF 0.000 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
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Table 5. Average Dynamic Correlation Coefficients (Hedge Fund Strategies vs 
S&P500). 
 ConvertArb Distressed EmergingTotal EquityHedge EquityNeutral EventDriven HFRI 
Total Period 0.56 0.65 0.65 0.78 0.39 0.71 0.77 
Crises Periods 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.84 0.49 0.79 0.83 
Non-Crisis 
Periods 
0.55 0.64 0.64 0.78 0.38 0.71 0.76 
Comparison 
(sig.) 
0.12 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.07 
 Macro MergerArb RelativeVal ShortSell Multistrategy FoF 
Total Period 0.39 0.57 0.59 -0.79 0.44 0.69 
Crises Periods 0.42 0.64 0.66 -0.84 0.55 0.75 
Non-Crisis 
Periods 
0.38 0.56 0.58 -0.78 0.44 0.69 
Comparison 
(sig.) 
0.02 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.07 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
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Table 6. Summary of the Models 
 R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
  Total Period Crises Total Period Crises 
Total 
Period Crises 
ConvertArb 0.51 0.56 0.26 0.32 2.41 4.43 
Distressed 0.54 0.40 0.29 0.16 1.51 2.70 
EmergingTotal 0.54 0.49 0.29 0.24 3.33 4.76 
EquityHedge 0.77 0.69 0.59 0.47 1.69 2.92 
EquityNeutral 0.48 0.40 0.23 0.16 0.74 1.43 
EventDriven 0.67 0.53 0.45 0.28 1.42 2.61 
HFRI 0.72 0.63 0.51 0.39 1.39 2.35 
Macro 0.39 0.59 0.15 0.34 1.65 1.58 
MergerArb 0.51 0.47 0.26 0.22 0.85 1.63 
RelativeVal 0.48 0.39 0.23 0.15 1.07 2.30 
ShortSell 0.81 0.79 0.65 0.63 3.01 4.94 
Multistrategy 0.18 0.65 0.03 0.42 0.20 0.19 
FoF 0.16 0.65 0.03 0.42 0.20 0.18 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
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Table 7. Coefficients and Significance 
  Alpha Beta SMB 
  Total Period Crisis Total Period Crisis Total Period Crisis 
  Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig 
ConvertArb 0.300 0.400 -1.320 0.130 0.210 0.004 0.290 0.050 0.156 0.002 0.150 0.530 
Distressed 0.390 0.000 -1.350 0.150 0.139 0.000 0.193 0.050 0.177 0.000 0.210 0.110 
EmergingTotal 0.180 0.041 -3.640 0.100 0.345 0.000 0.510 0.050 0.254 0.000 0.466 0.051 
EquityHedge 0.270 0.020 -1.005 0.185 0.349 0.000 0.437 0.006 0.227 0.000 0.304 0.500 
EquityNeutral 0.134 0.080 -0.197 0.477 0.070 0.000 0.149 0.020 0.028 0.050 0.007 0.920 
EventDriven 0.406 0.160 -0.922 0.770 0.198 0.000 0.302 0.018 0.198 0.140 0.262 0.470 
HFRI 0.293 0.002 -1.108 0.730 0.228 0.000 0.307 0.007 0.175 0.000 0.263 0.270 
Macro 0.335 0.003 0.580 0.090 0.070 0.070 0.020 0.665 0.066 0.010 0.057 0.463 
MergerArb 0.290 0.000 0.245 0.440 0.082 0.000 0.182 0.020 0.068 0.203 0.132 0.103 
RelativeVal 0.371 0.000 0.234 0.602 0.096 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.070 0.420 0.118 0.297 
ShortSell 0.064 0.756 -0.410 0.090 -0.548 0.000 -0.640 0.150 -0.495 0.000 -0.570 0.150 
Multistrategy 0.507 0.000 -0.210 0.750 0.050 0.000 0.300 0.010 0.040 0.379 -0.050 0.810 
FoF 0.410 0.280 -0.540 0.370 0.250 0.000 0.380 0.010 0.080 0.030 0.040 0.800 
  HML MoM 
  Total Period Total Period Crisis Total Period Crisis 
  Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig 
ConvertArb 0.300 0.400 0.156 0.001 -0.550 0.100 0.041 0.031 -0.128 0.400 
Distressed 0.390 0.000 0.036 0.260 -0.270 0.821 -0.300 0.129 -0.004 0.962 
EmergingTotal 0.180 0.041 -0.160 0.024 -0.133 0.531 -0.720 0.093 -0.010 0.952 
EquityHedge 0.270 0.020 -0.149 0.000 -0.185 0.161 0.033 0.131 0.021 0.831 
EquityNeutral 0.134 0.080 0.017 0.286 0.035 0.5833 0.056 0.000 0.089 0.070 
EventDriven 0.406 0.160 -0.024 0.428 -0.051 0.663 -0.046 0.012 -0.037 0.680 
HFRI 0.293 0.002 -0.130 0.000 -0.135 0.201 0.070 0.010 0.008 0.926 
Macro 0.335 0.003 -0.083 0.190 -0.080 0.914 0.048 0.230 0.162 0.600 
MergerArb 0.290 0.000 -0.070 0.698 -0.025 0.725 -0.020 0.680 -0.113 0.520 
RelativeVal 0.371 0.000 0.002 0.050 0.073 0.480 0.030 0.028 -0.076 0.343 
ShortSell 0.064 0.756 0.602 0.000 0.470 0.030 0.052 0.050 0.090 0.500 
Multistrategy 0.507 0.000 0.005 0.080 0.160 0.140 0.030 0.300 0.060 0.400 
FoF 0.410 0.280 0.000 0.980 0.040 0.670 0.080 0.000 0.080 0.220 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
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Figure 1. Hedge Fund Monthly Performance by Strategy (1995-2014) 
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Source: HFRI. 
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Figure 2. Dynamic Correlation Coefficients per Strategy vs S&P500 (1995-2014) 
 
Source: HFRI and Estimations. 
 
 
